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Abstract. The main mechanism of profit making is not production according 
to the outcomes of several analyses of the current economic crisis. This mechanism 
is circulation and exchange. Starting with this observation the paper goes through 
a number of aspects regarding the relation between crisis and economy at global 
level. These aspects consist in the recent financial turmoil; who pays for the crisis; 
stabilizing the financial sector; recession and the financial crisis; the 
internationalization of the crisis; commodities and the ecological crisis; an end to 
neo-liberalism; what should socialists demand. We notice and comment on how 
important current development in the wake of the banking crisis is for the 
transmission of that crisis to the rest of the economy and its interaction with the 
more general economic crisis now emerging. It was concluded that there are good 
chances that the current economic order to be broken. The future shape of the order 
will depend more on vision of managers than on the influence of the so called 
objective factors. 
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1. Introduction 
The current economic crisis has broken the temporary solutions which 
have ruled the world economy since the mid-1980s. Profits had been created 
through production but, in contradiction, were realized through circulation and 
exchange. Market fundamentalist laissez-faire  of the last 20 years has 
dramatically failed the test. Financial deregulation created the build-up of huge 
risky positions whose unwinding has pushed the global economy into a debt 
deflation that can only be countered by government debt inflation. 
There are three important starting points for understanding the current 
economic crisis. Firstly, what is happening at the moment represents the break-
up of the interlocking set of arrangements by which the world economy has 
been governed since the mid-1980s. These arrangements represented a 
temporary “solution” for capital to the crises which emerged a decade earlier. 
Secondly, the crises of the 1970s and the attempts to resolve them of the 1980s 
arose from a central contradiction within capitalism between the creation of 
profits in the sphere of production and the realization of those profits in the 
sphere of circulation and exchange. Thirdly, the historically weak situation of 
British capital, at least that section of British capital territorially located in 
Britain, has left Britain especially vulnerable to the crisis. 
The crisis itself has a number of dimensions but three in particular are 
crucial. The first is the build-up of debt, both corporate and public debt. For 
instance, in the US debt had an exponential evolution since 1940 until 2010. 
We can observe that in the following chart: 
 
 
 
 Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010). 
 
Figure 1. The evolution of US debt (trillions of 2009 dollars) 
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Linked with this is the likelihood of a return to international monetary 
instability and of the refusal of the rest of the world to fund US (and UK) trade 
deficits. The third factor is the effect of the ecological crisis on the world 
economy, which brings with it the prospect of an end to two decades of low 
commodity prices. However, these should be seen as medium-term 
developments, determining the underlying tensions within which more 
immediate changes take place. 
 
1. The recent financial turmoil 
 
The key development of the second half of 2008 has been a dramatic 
worsening of the first of the dimensions mentioned above; the financial crisis 
based on the accumulation of debt. The main cause of this has been growing 
recognition that the quantity of bad debt in the system was much larger than 
was previously thought. This in turn led to confusion amongst the US ruling 
class about the way to respond to the rising number of loan defaults. 
Unwillingly forced to nationalize the mortgage companies Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac (largely as a result of pressure from Chinese and Japanese 
investors in these companies) they then switched abruptly to allowing a leading 
investment bank, Lehman Brothers, to fail. As a consequence of the Lehman 
Brothers collapse the world assisted at a sudden increase in borrowing costs and 
increased risk aversion and implicitly the banking credit to the private sector 
suddenly dropped both in the developed and developing world. 
 
 
 Note: Refers to 69 countries with data through May 2009. Bank credit to the private 
sector is deflated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index. 
Sources:. World Bank (2010). 
Figure 2. The evolution of bank credit to the private sector after the collapse of Lehman 
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As we can see in the above graphic, since September 2008 the pace of credit 
expansion in the 69 developing countries for which data was available fell by 
almost half (World Bank, 2010), from a monthly increase of around 1.1 percent 
during January – September 2008 to a much more modest 0.6 monthly pace during 
September 2008 – May 2009. The decline was particularly pronounced in middle-
income countries, perhaps because their more integrated financial systems were 
most directly affected by the change in global financial conditions.  
This threw the banking system into a deeper crisis in three ways. First, the 
rising tide of bad debt threatened the solvency of the banks. Second, the 
apparent change in Federal Reserve policy from the earlier rescue of Bear 
Sterns created a panic in the inter-bank lending market. Uncertain of which 
banks would survive banks ceased to lend to anyone at all in this market 
causing the system as a whole to seize up. Thirdly, stock market investors also 
panicked sending bank shares into freefall. Since bank regulation is based on 
the idea that loans can only be a certain multiple of bank capital and since the 
decline in shares reduced capital significantly, this looked likely to lead to a 
massive decline in bank lending, which would have further threatened the 
stability of the system. While these problems were first apparent in the US and 
UK, where housing booms and bank deregulation had been especially strong, it 
quickly became clear that banks from many countries, particularly Continental 
Europe, had also made loans in these markets so that the banking crisis affected 
the major industrialized countries as a whole. 
As a result, both the world economic growth was deeply affected and the 
capacity for a feasible forecasting. So, current outlook is exceptionally 
uncertain, with risks still weighing on the downside, despite the lowering of the 
baselines, as illustrated in the following chart regarding the global growth. 
 
 Source: IMF estimates (2010). 
 
Figure 3. Risks to world GDP growth (Percent change) The Economic Crisis and Several Effects on Global Economy 
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This chart is constructed based on market indicators and suggest that the 
variance of growth risk is at present much greater than normal and also 
indicates the downward skewness of risks. This chart indicates the uncertainty 
around the world economic outlook central forecast with 50, 70, and 90 percent 
probability intervals. As shown, the 70 percent confidence interval includes the 
50 percent interval, and the 90 percent confidence interval includes the 50 and 
70 percent intervals (IMF, 2010). 
The result of this has been an abrupt change in policy towards bailing-out 
the banks. The form of this has varied across countries. The US response, led 
by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, who is rooted in Wall Street, has been 
particularly shameless (the original proposal by Paulson was simply that the US 
government, funded by taxpayers, would buy up the worthless debt from the 
banks – a straightforward subsidy with no control over future bank behavior 
whatsoever). The UK government plan, which has effectively been adopted by 
the EU, provides some potential leverage for political debate in that it involves 
buying shares in the banks. This allows for discussion about the nature of state 
control over the banking system and about who should pay for the crisis. But it 
is clear that the initial aim of the government was to have the minimum amount 
of state involvement in the financial sector and to provide funds which would 
then be used to restore the banks to profitability in the hope of a quick sale of 
the governments’ stake. The model was the Scandinavian restructuring of the 
banks following the financial crisis there in the early 1990s. 
 
2. Who pays for the crisis? 
 
The immediate effect of the recognition of the bad debt in the housing 
market is that a large amount of capital which was valued at a certain amount, 
on the basis that the housing loans would be repaid in full, is no longer worth 
what was originally envisaged. This capital falls into two categories. Firstly, 
there is the capital directly tied up in providing housing linked to sub-prime 
mortgages, both the loan capital used to provide the mortgages and capital 
employed in construction and housing development. Secondly, there is the 
capital in other industries which has been invested in the expectation of demand 
originating from a booming housing market; in particular that which depends 
on high levels of demand resulting from homeowners borrowing against the 
equity in their houses – something now unlikely to happen in the foreseeable 
future. 
Any revalorization of capital of this kind raises the question of who will 
pay for the loss – capital or labor. The financial sector has been quite brazen 
about trying to shift the cost of the crisis onto labor – even to the extent of Florina Bran, Carmen Valentina Rădulescu, Ildikó Ioan, Florentina Olivia Bălu 
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formulating plans to use taxpayers’ money to maintain bonus payments. The 
mechanisms for ensuring this shift include the following: 
  Direct subsidies for the banks funded by the taxpayer; 
  Rebuilding of the profit base by refusing to pass on interest rate cuts to 
borrowers. This may well be made easier by mergers like the Lloyds-
HBOS merger, which will reduce competition and increase the 
dependence of households on a small number of large institutions; 
  An attack on the job security, wages and conditions of bank staff in 
order to cut costs. Again, state-sponsored mergers may help this 
process by providing the means to close branches; 
  Reduction of the interest rate paid out to savers and depositors. 
To the extent that the state has attempted to act as something other than an 
agent of capital and to enforce terms on the banks, the banks have responded by 
threatening to bring the system down if they don’t get their way. This has led to 
some conflict between the government and the banks, particularly with regard 
to the enforcement of cuts in interest rates. However, the cuts which have been 
achieved here have come at the expense of even larger cuts in rates paid to 
savers which have serious implications for both current and future pensioners. 
In addition, the bail-out as a whole has resulted in a considerable ideological 
cost both in terms of the reputation of the financial sector within society as a 
whole (which is probably now at an all time low) and in terms of the increased 
legitimacy of regulation and even state ownership. 
 
3. Stabilizing the financial sector 
 
While it is difficult to predict events with any certainty, it appears most 
likely at present that the injections of funds made so far have restored a measure 
of stability to the banking system. While the housing boom in the US and a 
number of European countries was a significant speculative bubble, it did not 
represent sufficient lending in itself to bring down the financial systems of the 
industrialized world (The Economist of September 27 2008 reports a June 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation estimate of about $500 billion worth of 
“seriously delinquent” residential mortgages in the US out of a total of $10.6 
trillion). It should also be remembered that even if mortgages are not repaid in 
full the houses on which they were secured are not entirely worthless. 
In assessing the cost of this stabilization we should be cautious about the 
headline figures such as the $700 billion attached to the US bail-out. The bail 
outs comprise three different kinds of spending. First, there is direct financial 
assistance to the banks. This is a real cost. Second, there are loan guarantees. 
These will only become a real cost if the loans that are made from now on result The Economic Crisis and Several Effects on Global Economy 
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in defaults. Basically they are confidence building measures and it is not 
expected that they will require much if any actual spending. Thirdly, there is 
direct government lending to get the money markets flowing again. Again this 
will only be a real cost if the interest rates at which the lending takes place are 
unrealistically low or if the loans made result in default. 
The real cost of the UK bank bail-out at present appears to be around £37 
billion; i.e. the actual financial assistance being given to the banks. Even this 
will not necessarily be a long-term cost if the stake taken in the banks can be 
resold at a higher price at a later date. Nonetheless, it is a significant amount of 
money and will lead to a record government budget deficit this year. The 
following graph shows how the UK's budget deficit has fluctuated as a 
percentage of the country's economic output (GDP): 
 
 
 Source: UK National Statistics (2010). 
Figure 4. The UK's budget deficit (%) 
 
The sums involved in other European countries appear rather similar – for 
example the Financial Times of 5 November reports that Italy is planning to 
allocate £24 billion to recapitalize its banks. 
Here it is also important to recognize that the immediate impact of this 
government spending is only a small part of the projected increases in budget 
deficits in the medium term. More important is the loss of tax revenue and the 
extra expenditure resulting from the slowdown in growth arising from the crisis. 
Analyzing Alistair Darling’s pre-budget statement in the Financial Times, 
Martin Wolf points out that tax receipts are now expected to fall by 3 
percentage points of GDP in 2009-10 and observes that `these changes are 
overwhelmingly due to revisions in the fiscal capacity and level of GDP; a 
permanent reduction in taxes on financial sector profits and housing Florina Bran, Carmen Valentina Rădulescu, Ildikó Ioan, Florentina Olivia Bălu 
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transactions; and, more strikingly, a lasting loss of GDP. In 2010, the economy 
is now expected to be some 5.5 percent smaller than forecast in the budget 
(Wolf, 2008). Output growth in the developing countries, in contrast, is 
expected to recover at a faster pace and to reach 5.3 per cent in 2010, up from 
1.9 per cent in 2009, but will remain well below the pre-crisis pace of more than 
7 per cent per annum. Some developing economies have rebounded earlier than 
other countries. Fiscal stimulus and resumption of trade in manufactures lifted 
economies in Asia, in particular. Economies in transition are expected to see a 
significant turnaround from the decline of their combined GDP by 6.5 per cent 
in 2009. Growth in 2010 is projected to be positive but, at 1.6 per cent, signals a 
very weak recovery at best (United Nations forecast, 2010). A synthetic table 
with selected figures from the IMF World Economic Outlook is shown below.  
 
 Table 1 
The forecast in GDP for main areas and countries in the world 
 
COUNTRY/ REGION  2009 FORECAST  2010 FORECAST 
World -1.4  2.5 
Advanced economies  -3.8  0.6 
United States  -2.6  0.8 
Euro area-  4.8  -0.3 
Germany -6.2  -0.6 
France -3.0  0.4 
Japan -6.0  1.7 
United Kingdom  -4.2  0.2 
Canada -2.3  1.6 
Other advanced economies  -3.9  1.0 
Newly industrialized Asian economies  -5.2  1.4 
Emerging and developing economies  1.5  4.7 
Africa 1.8  4.1 
Central and eastern Europe  -5.0  1.0 
Russia -6.5  1.5 
China 7.5  8.5 
India 5.4  6.5 
ASEAN -0.3  3.7 
Middle East  2.0  3.7 
Brazil -1.3  2.5 
Mexico -7.3  3.0 
Source: IMF (2010). 
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4. Recession and the financial crisis 
 
The banking crisis has also raised the issue of the kind of financial system 
which will emerge if and when the initial stabilization has been achieved. It is 
very difficult for New Labor to avoid this debate now because by taking stakes 
in the banks they have inescapably raised the issue of how these stakes will be 
used to enforce control over the financiers. However, while this would seem to 
be a golden opportunity for social democracy to reassert ideas about regulation 
of the system the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism over the last two 
decades has left it unable to articulate any very convincing vision of an 
alternative. The main ideas about regulating banks currently being discussed 
include strengthening the capital requirements for making loans (basically a 
stronger version of what already exists), regulating bank bonuses and banning 
certain kinds of market transaction (such as “short-selling” where traders sell 
shares they do not actually own in the expectation that they can buy them up 
more cheaply before completing the transaction). None of these will lead to any 
significant differences between the financial system which emerges from the 
current turmoil and what we have seen in recent years. 
The most important current development in the wake of the banking crisis 
is the transmission of that crisis to the rest of the economy and its interaction 
with the more general economic crisis now emerging. The most obvious issue 
here is the onset of recession. The central reason for the recession is the 
dependence of consumer demand in particular but also business investment on 
high levels of debt over the last two decades. Now that lending is contracting 
this debt-fuelled expansion is no longer possible and a sharp economic 
slowdown looks inevitable. The fall in house prices is also worsening the 
slowdown in consumer spending as households can no longer borrow against 
rising equity values. 
There are two fundamental reasons for the reliance on debt. Consumption 
has come to depend on debt because of the contradiction between driving wages 
down to generate profits in production and needing to ensure demand in order 
to sell the goods produced and realize these profits. The most obvious 
manifestation of this is growing income inequality and it is no accident that the 
build-up of debt has been worst in countries with the greatest disparity in 
incomes, notably the UK and USA. 
Linked to this is the way in which production in general, but especially 
investment, has come to rely on debt as a result of the weakness of profitability 
in the productive sector. As Robert Wade puts it “the rate of profit of non-
financial corporations fell steeply between 1950-73 and 2000-06 – in the US, 
by roughly a quarter. In response, firms “invested” increasingly in financial Florina Bran, Carmen Valentina Rădulescu, Ildikó Ioan, Florentina Olivia Bălu 
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speculation” (Wade, 2008). Consequently, without debt being available to fund 
expansion recession appears inevitable. 
The response of governments to the recession has been firstly to increase 
their own borrowing and secondly to encourage central banks to cut interest 
rates. But both of these create their own problems. Government borrowing is 
limited by the cost of the bank bail-outs. High levels of borrowing can also 
push up interest rates or reduce currency values as discussed above. Both of 
these effects lower household real incomes and decrease spending frustrating 
the original purpose of the borrowing. The strategy adopted by the British 
government in response to this is to make tax cuts explicitly temporary. But this 
risks making them ineffective since households will simply save any extra 
income in anticipation of future tax rises. 
Cutting interest rates is also difficult. Central banks only directly control 
short-term interest rates and private banks have simply refused to cut long-term 
rates in response to central bank policies. Cuts in interest rates also have the 
effect of lowering both the actual returns of current pensioners living off 
savings and the prospective returns of future pensioners both of which may 
lower consumption. 
More fundamentally, the room for government policy to boost the 
economy is limited so long as spending depends on debt because of low wages 
and inequality and so long as new debt is not forthcoming. Consequently, the 
slowdown is likely to be protracted and severe. 
 
5. The internationalization of the crisis 
 
The growth of debt over the last two decades in countries like the USA 
and UK has been dependent on international flows of capital which in turn have 
resulted from a significant degree of exchange rate stability compared to the 
turbulence of the early 1980s. Conversely, a move towards a different pattern of 
accumulation will inevitably put great strain on global monetary arrangements. 
So far the crisis has mainly manifested itself in domestic monetary 
developments in the largest economies, although countries like Iceland, 
Ukraine, Hungary and the Baltic States have been driven to seek IMF or EU 
help. But this is now changing and the crisis is being internationalized in three 
ways. 
The first of these is the effect of current developments on so-called 
“emerging market economies”. Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman 
gives the example of Russia where “while the Russian government was 
accumulating an impressive $560bn hoard of foreign exchange, Russian 
corporations and banks were running up an almost equally impressive $460bn The Economic Crisis and Several Effects on Global Economy 
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foreign debt...This truly is the mother of all currency crises and it represents a 
fresh disaster for the world’s financial system”  (Krugman, 2008). The 
unwinding of the “carry trade” (where financiers borrow in markets with low 
interest rates such as Japan and lend abroad) is beginning to have a devastating 
effect on such currencies. 
Secondly, countries like the UK and USA, which have been at the centre 
of the crisis, see their currencies in danger of sliding, both because their 
governments need to borrow abroad and because of a general lack of 
confidence. At the time of writing the dollar remains relatively strong simply 
because of the weakness of other currencies, but sterling has fallen dramatically 
against both the dollar and the euro. 
The third factor is increasing pressure on countries to devalue their 
currencies in order to boost exports at a time of falling demand. Even the 
Chinese government is now considering this to American consternation (Dyer, 
2008). 
All of these developments are likely to herald a period of much greater 
turbulence for exchange rates and capital flows. Yet underlying the immediate 
changes in currency values is a deeper disagreement about future strategies 
amongst the international capitalist class. 
The central long-run task for capital is to develop a strategy of 
accumulation which does not depend on the build-up of unsustainable debt 
(Martin Wolf’s article in the Financial Times of November 5 entitled “Why 
agreeing a new Bretton Woods is vital and so hard” is in many ways a 
manifesto for this process). This process involves a wide range of different 
potential conflicts but one issue in particular is seen as increasingly central. 
This is the rebalancing of world economic growth away from the USA (and 
UK) towards the surplus economies of Asia and elsewhere, especially China. 
The more far-seeing representatives of capital, such as Wolf, are very 
clear that if the current pattern of global imbalances persists, so will recurrent 
financial crises of the kind we have seen recently. Large flows of funds into the 
US and UK will result in risky lending whatever the regulatory structures 
created. The only way this can be avoided is through a shift towards domestic 
consumption in countries like China and a move away from consumption 
towards investment and, especially, exports in the US. 
This kind of strategy is extremely difficult to implement in practice 
because the unplanned, spontaneous nature of capitalism makes this kind of 
rebalancing very destabilizing and risky. This was shown in the mid-1980s, 
when the decision to co-ordinate a rise in the value of the yen and shift the 
Japanese economy towards domestic demand and away from exports triggered 
a speculative frenzy of lending resulting in a slump lasting almost two decades. Florina Bran, Carmen Valentina Rădulescu, Ildikó Ioan, Florentina Olivia Bălu 
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Yet, an even more serious problem today is that there is no clear 
agreement on the way forward between the representatives of different national 
capitals. That has been shown within Europe with regard to the arguments 
between the German and British governments over the degree to which 
government spending and fiscal deficits are an appropriate response to the 
crisis. More serious, however, are the underlying tensions between the US and 
Asian governments  (Pilling, 2008). These tensions reflect not just economic 
concerns, but also shift in the balance of power within international capitalism. 
 
6. Commodities and the ecological crisis 
 
The third aspect of the crisis of capitalism raised at the outset of this 
article is the question of commodity prices and the constraints on production 
arising from ecological factors. There is a strong temptation at present to 
downplay this issue as oil prices in particular fall. 
As we can see in the above figure, during the history any major event 
influences the oil price. Regarding the financial crisis of 2007/2009, there are 
four reasons for which we consider this will lead at the increasing in the oil 
price on a long run. 
Firstly, oil prices remain at high levels compared to five or ten years ago, 
as do food prices in much of the world. Even in countries like Britain rising 
energy costs are seriously affecting working class living standards while for the 
poor in developing economies food costs are still devastating. 
Secondly, to the extent that energy and food prices have declined it has 
only been because of the severity of the recession. Any sustained upturn in 
growth that does take place, in particular one based on a shift towards domestic 
consumption in countries like China, is likely to lead to renewed price rises. 
Here it is important not to assume that all the commodity price inflation of 2006 
and 2007 was due to speculation. This did play a role, especially as speculators 
moved away from the dollar during this period, but it was by no means the only 
factor. The price rises of those years also indicated a genuine constraint on 
global capitalist growth arising from ecological limits. 
 The Economic Crisis and Several Effects on Global Economy 
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Figure 5. Major events and real world oil prices, 1970-2006 
 
Thirdly, given the irrationalities of capitalist decision-making any sharp 
decline in commodity and fuel prices which does take place over the next few 
years is likely to stop the development of new sources of supply and worsen the 
price rises that will occur if growth restarts. 
Fourthly, the current recession is not slowing down the process of 
international environmental degradation, especially climate change. The impact 
of this on food supplies in particular represents a long-run trend which will 
assert itself increasingly sharply in future years whatever the level of global 
output. 
All this means that, while at present governments and central banks are 
not worrying about inflation when trying desperately to restart production, any 
sustained recovery from the crisis is likely to reawaken inflationary fears. This 
will constitute a severe constraint on the economic options available to them in 
the longer term. 
 
7. An end to neo-liberalism? 
 
An important question here is that of the extent to which the current crisis 
represents an end to the political hegemony of neo-liberalism. Linked to this is 
the issue of the revival of Keynesianism. Here it is important to recognize that 
state expenditure is by no means incompatible with neo-liberalism provided Florina Bran, Carmen Valentina Rădulescu, Ildikó Ioan, Florentina Olivia Bălu 
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such expenditure is in the interests of capital (Kilmister, 2004). The initial aim 
of New Labor in rescuing the banks was very much within this framework, as 
discussed above. 
However, this does not mean that the resolution of the crisis will remain 
within the bounds of neo-liberalism. A neo-liberal outcome in which the banks 
are restructured and re-privatized while accumulation is restarted on a free-
market basis remains one possible outcome but by no means the only one. 
Already, in the UK the government has been driven to be more interventionist 
with regard to management of the banks than it had originally intended and to 
adopt fiscal policy measures which were also not planned even a few months 
ago. So, far such measures – pressuring interest rate reductions and raising 
income tax to 45 percent for higher earners – do not represent a significant 
break with past policies. But they do indicate a space for debate around political 
alternatives which is opening up. The way in which this space will be occupied 
will depend partly on how the crisis develops but also on the ability of socialists 
to articulate alternative responses to what is happening to that proposed by 
capital. 
More generally, the way in which the crisis has thrown into question the 
way in which the world economy has functioned since the mid-1980s indicates 
that even if neo-liberalism is able temporarily to resolve the situation on its 
terms the way in which it will do this will differ significantly from what has 
been seen in recent years. It will also involve turbulent and difficult adjustments 
which in turn will open up further opportunities for socialists to present 
alternatives. 
 
8. What should socialists demand? 
 
In raising demands in response to the crisis it is important that socialists 
emphasize the nature of the crisis as a general crisis of capitalism, which has its 
roots in the contradictions of productive capital as much as in the financial 
sector and which is caused by global factors, not the economic policies 
followed by a particular national capital. In this context the following demands 
seem especially important: 
  Nationalization of the banks coupled with popular control over the 
allocation of credit and use of savings. 
  A massive program of public works to combat the recession with 
particular emphasis on ecological production and a shift in the 
economy towards “green” technologies. Investment in alternative 
forms of transport and energy. The Economic Crisis and Several Effects on Global Economy 
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  Taxation of the income and wealth of the rich and limits on higher 
earnings to remove the reliance on debt to maintain consumption. 
  Opening of the books of both the financial institutions and industrial 
companies to public scrutiny in order to prevent any use of the crisis as 
an excuse to force through cost-cutting and redundancies 
  Indexation of wages, pensions and benefits to protect workers against 
rises in food and energy prices. 
  An extensive program of publicly-owned and financed house building 
to avoid another housing bubble. A moratorium on any re-possessions 
for mortgage arrears. 
  A government guarantee for pensions. Future pensions to be paid for 
from taxation of the rich and not to be reliant on returns from shares 
and bonds. Current pensioners to be compensated for loss of income 
resulting from interest rate reductions. 
  Control over international financial speculation both through controls 
on capital movements and through taxation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The current crisis represents the most significant set of economic events 
internationally since the decade spanning the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. 
The economic order created following that turbulent decade is now breaking 
down. What replaces it will depend not just on “objective” circumstances but 
on the ability of the left to put forward its own vision of an economy based on 
need rather than profit as a replacement for the finance-driven accumulation of 
the last twenty years. 
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